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(Dated:)
We propose a novel double-entanglement-based quantum cryptography protocol that is both ef-
ficient and deterministic. The proposal uses photon pairs with entanglement both in polarization
and in time degrees of freedom; each measurement in which both of the two communicating parties
register a photon can establish one and only one perfect correlation and thus deterministically create
a key bit. Eavesdropping can be detected by violation of local realism. A variation of the protocol
shows a higher security, similarly to the six-state protocol, under individual attacks. Our scheme
allows a robust implementation under current technology.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 42.50.Dv
Entanglement and nonlocality lie at the heart of mod-
ern understanding of quantum foundations. One of the
most striking aspects of entanglement is that certain sta-
tistical correlations derived for entangled states can be
in conflict with local realism [1], as quantitatively shown
by Bell’s inequalities (BI) [2]. These fundamental is-
sues were originally considered at the very boundary of
physics and philosophy. Yet, they have found practical
applications in quantum information science. In a re-
markable paper by Ekert [3], BI have a profound utility
in quantum cryptography (QC) (or, quantum key distri-
bution, QKD) [4, 5, 6, 7]. Actually, there is a fascinating
link [3, 7, 8, 9] between security of certain quantum com-
munication protocols and BI. However, quantum viola-
tions of local realism also occur in an “all-versus-nothing”
(AVN) form [10, 11, 12, 13], which is more striking in the
sense that the contradiction between quantum mechanics
and local realism arises even for definite correlations. It
thus remains to be seen if such an AVN nonlocality can
have any application in quantum information, particu-
larly, in QC. Most of the QC protocols [4, 5, 6, 7] pro-
posed so far are non-deterministic as only less than 50%
qubits detected can be further used as key bits. This may
be a practical problem, e.g., in the one-time-pad secret-
key cryptosystem [7]. Such a problem may be eliminated
by deterministic QC protocol and secret direct commu-
nication, which attracted some recent interest [14, 15].
For QC experiments realized with faint laser pulses,
they may be insecure under the so-called beamsplitter
(BS) attack [7]. This is because the currently available
photon sources have a finite probability of emittting more
than one photon (or more than one entangled photon pair
for entangled photon sources). An eavesdropper (usually
called Eve) could in principle use a channel with lower
photon loss or without loss and only allow those attenu-
ated pulses containing n (n ≥ 2) photons to reach the re-
ceiver. For these pulses she can use a BS to steal at least
one photon, thus getting full information without being
detected. However, the entanglement-based QC proto-
FIG. 1: A proposed implementation of our QKD protocol.
cols (such as Ekert’s [3] and ours to be described below)
exploit entanglement as certain “security resource” and
do not suffer from this kind of problem as the security
therein is guaranteed by the violations of BI.
In this paper, based on the previously proved two-
party AVN nonlocality (or inseparability) for two doubly-
entangled photon pairs [13], we propose a novel QC pro-
tocol which is efficient and deterministic: Each detected
photon pair can establish a key bit with the help of clas-
sical communications. This deterministic feature of our
protocol stems from the very nature of the two-party
AVN nonlocality: The two communicating parties always
have perfect quantum correlations for whatever measure-
ment bases they choose. An eavesdropper can be de-
tected by observing the violation of local realism for the
quantum channel. A variation of the present protocol is
similar to the six-state protocol [16] and shows a higher
security under simple individual attacks. A remarkable
advantage of the present scheme is that all required mea-
surements can be done with linear optical elements and
as such, the experimental realization of the protocol is
within the reach of current technology.
2In our protocol (see Fig. 1) “doubly-entangled” photon
pairs (photon-1 and photon-2) in the state
|Ψ〉12 =
1
2
(|H〉1 |H〉2 + |V 〉1 |V 〉2)(|↑〉1 |↑〉2 + |↓〉1 |↓〉2)
(1)
are generated via spontaneous parametric down conver-
sion (SPDC) and sent, respectively, to two communica-
tors, Alice and Bob. Here |H〉 (|V 〉) stands for photons
with horizontal (vertical) polarization; |↑〉 and |↓〉 span
an orthonormal basis for either time or path states of
photons. |Ψ〉12 is maximally entangled both in polar-
ization and in time/path degrees of freedom of photons.
The creation of polarization-path entanglement was dis-
cussed in [13, 17]. With a pump interferometer in Fig. 1
one can generate polarization-time double entanglement
(More details are given at the end of this paper).
To create secure keys, each party needs to measure ob-
servables involving the spin-type operators x = |H〉 〈V |+
|V 〉 〈H |, z = |H〉 〈H | − |V 〉 〈V | (for polarization) and
x′ = |↑〉 〈↓|+ |↓〉 〈↑|, z′ = |↑〉 〈↑| − |↓〉 〈↓| (for time/path).
Particularly, the two parties should measure nine observ-
ables:
A1


z1
x′1
z1 · x
′
1
, A2


z′1
x1
x1 · z
′
1
, A3


z1z
′
1
x1x
′
1
z1z
′
1 · x1x
′
1
;
B1


x′2
x2
x2 · x
′
2
, B2


z2
z′2
z2 · z
′
2
, B3


z2x
′
2
x2z
′
2
z2x
′
2 · x2z
′
2
.
(2)
Here Alice (Bob) arranges her (his) local observables into
three groups A1, A2 and A3 (B1, B2 and B3), each of
which has three operators. As in Ref. [13], the three
operators of each group can be measured by one and the
same apparatus (to be described below). This is crucial
in the AVN argument of nonlocality without the necessity
of an additional assumption of noncontextuality [13, 18].
When measuring the three operators of each group, e.g.,
A1 (other groups are similar), one measures z1 and x
′
1
simultaneously with the apparatus (also labeled as A1),
thus also giving the measurement result of z1 · x
′
1, which
is just the product of the readouts of z1 and x
′
1. To
denote this fact we then use (·) to separate operators
(as in z1 · x
′
1, x1 · z
′
1, x2 · x
′
2 and z2 · z
′
2) or operator
products (as in z1z
′
1 · x1x
′
1 and z2x
′
2 · x2z
′
2) that can be
identified as local “elements of reality” in the nonlocality
argument [13]. In this way, the three operators in each
group are co-measurable and measured simultaneously
by the same apparatus. Totally, one thus requires six
apparatuses (A1, A2 and A3 for Alice; B1, B2 and B3 for
Bob), which can be realized without any mutual conflict
only by linear optical elements [13].
Now we are ready to describe the present QC protocol.
For each of the emitted pairs, photon-1 (photon-2) goes
to Alice (Bob) who then measures an operator group,
which is chosen randomly and independently from the
three groups A1, A2 and A3 (B1, B2 and B3). Any local
outcome of the above measurements is completely ran-
dom and can of course be either −1 or +1, representing
thus one bit of information.
Now one immediately has the following: For each pair
of operator groups chosen by Alice and Bob, there is one
and only one pair of outcomes of the local operators (or
operator products) that possesses perfect correlation; to-
tally Alice and Bob can establish nine pairs of perfectly
correlated local outcomes as each of the two parties has
three operator groups. For instance, if Alice (Bob) mea-
sures the three operators in A1 (B2), then only the out-
comes of z1 and z2 will show perfect correlation, i.e., their
product will certainly be 1. The above result stems from
the fact that for the photon pairs in |Ψ〉12 one has the
following nine eigenequations [13]
z1 · z2
∣∣|Ψ〉
12
= 1, z′1 · z
′
2
∣∣|Ψ〉
12
= 1, (3)
x1 · x2
∣∣|Ψ〉
12
= 1, x′1 · x
′
2
∣∣|Ψ〉
12
= 1, (4)
z1z
′
1 · z2 · z
′
2
∣∣|Ψ〉
12
= 1, x1x
′
1 · x2 · x
′
2
∣∣|Ψ〉
12
= 1, (5)
z1 · x
′
1 · z2x
′
2
∣∣|Ψ〉
12
= 1, x1 · z
′
1 · x2z
′
2
∣∣|Ψ〉
12
= 1, (6)
z1z
′
1 · x1x
′
1 · z2x
′
2 · x2z
′
2
∣∣|Ψ〉
12
= −1. (7)
Here we have used a simplification in notions, e.g., z1 ·
z2
∣∣|Ψ〉
12
= 1 means z1 · z2 |Ψ〉12 = |Ψ〉12.
After the above measurements have taken place on
a photon pair, Alice and Bob can announce in public
by classical communications which of the three operator
group they have measured. They discard all measure-
ments in which either or both of them fail to register a
photon at all. In the case where Alice and Bob have de-
tected a photon simultaneously from the emitted photon
pairs, they can establish deterministically a secure key as
they can know from the classical communications which
pair of their outcomes has perfect correlation. For ex-
ample, let us again assume that Alice (Bob) has chosen
the apparatus A1 (B2). In this case the two parties will
certainly obtain z1 · z2
∣∣|Ψ〉
12
= 1, from which Alice using
her own outcome of z1 can predict with certainty Bob’s
outcome of z2, and vise versa. Any one of this type of
perfect correlations can then be used to create determin-
istically a secure key bit. The deterministic feature of
our QC protocol is thus demonstrated. As a comparison,
Ekert’s protocol is nondeterministic in the sense that suc-
cessful detection of a photon by both Alice and Bob can
establish at most 2/9 raw key.
All QKD protocols are consisted of two parts: the
quantum part producing the raw keys and the classical
part (e.g., reconciliation and privacy amplification) [7].
The later is not considered here as it is the same for all
cryptographic protocols [19]. Now it is ready to see that
our protocol is more effective than traditional protocols
(e.g., Ekert’s protocol) in the quantum part. For com-
parison, in Ekert’s protocol 7/9 of detected photon pairs
3is of no use for establishing raw keys and will be sacrificed
to detect eavesdropping. Thus, in the quantum part our
protocol is 1/(1 − 7/9) = 4.5 times more efficient than
the original Ekert protocol.
A complete security analysis of our QKD protocol is
very difficult and beyond the scope of this paper. Here
we consider the security issue by first following Ekert’s
security analysis [3]. In Ekert’s protocol, the presence
of an eavesdropper can be detected in conjunction with
BI. This is because a possible intervention (interception,
detection, and substitution of photons) by the eavesdrop-
per is equivalent to introducing local elements of physical
reality into the system. Following this line of thought,
Eve’s intervention would acquire information, e.g., by
randomly measuring observables like A ∈ {A1, A2, A3}
and B ∈ {B1, B2, B3} with certain results (denoted by
λ); afterwards she sends the replacement of the detected
photons to Alice and Bob. Now what Alice and Bob do
is just to measure certain predetermined values of these
operators (i.e., elements of physical reality) as measured
already by Eve. In this case, Alice and Bob would obtain
the correlation EA·B =
∫
dλρ(λ)EA(λ)EB(λ), where the
integration may also be summation if the number of λ is
finite and ρ(λ) is the probability for Eve’s result λ. Thus,
in the presence of Eve, one has [12, 13]
〈O〉Eve ≡
∫
dλρ(λ)
[
−Ez1z′1·x1x′1·z2x′2·x2z′2 + Ez1z′1·z2·z′2
+ Ex1x′1·x2·x′2 + Ez1·x′1·z2x′2 + Ex1·z′1·x2z′2
+Ez1·z2 + Ez′1·z′2 + Ex1·x2 + Ex′1·x′2
]
≤ 7. (8)
Here EA·B = [C(A·B = +1)−C(A·B = −1)]/[C(A·B =
+1)+C(A·B = −1)], where C(A·B = ±1) are the count-
ing numbers when the measured variableA·B = ±1. The
measured nine sets of perfect correlations allow Alice and
Bob to infer EA·B in (8) and, then, 〈O〉Eve. The observed
violation of (8) can thus detect Eve’s eavesdropping by
randomly choosing a small portion (“fair sample”) of the
generated key bits. Note that quantum prediction of the
upper bound of (8) can be 9 [12, 13], as can be seen from
Eqs. (3)-(7).
The present scheme for detecting the eavesdropper is
conceptually striking in the following sense. In Ekert’s
protocol, perfect correlations are used to establish se-
cure keys, while statistical correlations are used to detect
eavesdropping in terms of BI. However, in our protocol
perfect correlations play the dual role of both establish-
ing secure keys and detecting eavesdroppers. We have
thus demonstrated the link for the security against eaves-
dropping of our protocol and a two-party version of Bell’s
theorem, and the definite quantum predictions used in a
two-party AVN nonlocality argument may have fascinat-
ing application in the deterministic QKD protocol.
Note that |Ψ〉12 is a maximally entangled state in a 4⊗4
dimensional Hilbert space [13]. To achieve higher security
in QKD protocols, one may use either high-dimensional
systems [19] or more alternative settings (e.g., three-base
protocol [16]). Thus one might expect that our QKD
protocol using three measurement bases per party and
high-dimensional entanglement has a bonus of higher se-
curity. To show that this is indeed the case, recall that
Ekert’s protocol can be regarded as a variation [5] of
the BB84 protocol [4], and as such the security of the
former can be guaranteed by the security of the latter.
Similarly, let us consider the case where Alice prepares
the doubly-entangled pair herself, measures one of her
three operator groups in (2), and sends to Bob photon-2,
which might be subject to Eve’s intercept-resend attacks.
This modified protocol is then, in some sense, similar to
the six-state (three-base) protocol [16], which is more
secure than the origianl BB84 protocol. For instance,
when Alice measures A1, she will collapse her state onto
the basis vectors |H〉1
∣∣↑¯〉
1
(z1 = 1, x
′
1 = 1) or |V 〉1
∣∣↓¯〉
1
(z1 = −1, x
′
1 = −1) for which z1 · x
′
1 = 1, or |H〉1
∣∣↓¯〉
1
(z1 = 1, x
′
1 = −1) or |V 〉1
∣∣↑¯〉
1
(z1 = −1, x
′
1 = 1) for
which z1 · x
′
1 = −1. Here
∣∣↑¯〉 = 1√
2
(|↑〉 + |↓〉) and∣∣↓¯〉 = 1√
2
(|↑〉 − |↓〉). If Alice gets |H〉1
∣∣↑¯〉
1
(with the
probability of 1/4), Bob’s state will be equivalently pre-
pared as |H〉2
∣∣↑¯〉
2
, which is exactly the equal-amplitude
superposition of the basis vectors for any of {B1, B2, B3}.
Note that any two basis vectors |eα〉 and |eβ〉 belonging to
different bases in {B1, B2, B3} satisfy |〈eβ |eα〉|
2
= 1/4,
i.e., the three bases {B1, B2, B3} are mutually unbiased.
If Eve, with the probability of 2/3, uses wrong bases, she
gets wrong perfect correlations with Alice and thus no
information. Explicit calculation shows that Eve can be
detected with the probability of 1/2 in this case. Thus
Bob’s error rate under the simple individual attacks is
1/3, implying that our protocol might be more secure,
similarly to the six-state protocol, but eliminates the lat-
ter’s disadvantage of low efficiency.
A recent experiment [20] (see also [21]) has success-
fully created the path-polarization-entangled two-photon
states. Note that the two photons experiences two differ-
ent paths from the source to the detectors. Then the co-
herence of the path entanglement will be sensitive to the
relative phase that a photons would acquire as it propa-
gates along the two paths. The unavoidable fluctuations
in the relative phase may destroy the path entanglement.
To maintain the path coherence, especially in the long-
distance case, the long-distance interferometric stability
is required, which is extremely difficult in practice.
Fortunately, one can overcome the above problem by
using pulsed entanglement source where the two photons
are entangled both in time (i.e., time-bin entanglement
[22, 23]) and in polarization. To create the required en-
tanglement, a short, ultraviolet (UV) laser pulse is sent
first through an unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferome-
ter (the pump interferometer) and then through a BBO
crystal (see Fig. 1). The pump pulse is splitted by the
first (50%-50%) BS (BS1) into two pulses, one propa-
4gating along the short path and another along the long
path. If the pulse duration is shorter than the arm length
difference, the output from (50%-50%) BS2 is two pulses
well separated in time. For the case where there is one
and only one polarization-entangled pair [assumed to be
in 1√
2
(|H〉1 |H〉2+ |V 〉1 |V 〉2) for definiteness] production
after the “early” and “late” pulses pass through the BBO
crystal, the polarization-time entangled two-photon state
|Ψ〉12 =
1
2
(|H〉1 |H〉2 + |V 〉1 |V 〉2)(|e〉1 |e〉2 + |l〉1 |l〉2) is
then created by adjusting the phase φ. Here |↑〉 ≡ |e〉
(early time) and |↓〉 ≡ |l〉 (late time) are two orthonor-
mal time states of photons. In Fig. 1 the pulse time
detector can determine the emission time of the pump
laser, giving a time fiducial signal.
Now each photon hold by Alice or Bob propagates
along the same path. In this way, the time-entanglement
is much more robust than the path-entanglement. In-
deed, time-bin entanglement has been experimentally
distributed over 50 km in optical fibers [23]. However,
time-bin measurement is non-deterministic [22, 23] and
may thus reduce the efficiency of the key production.
Here we propose a measurement scheme with simple
linear optical elements and fast switches. The setup in
Fig. 1 can measure all local observables in (2) by using
two “time-path transmitters” (TPT) with optical paths
identical to the pump interferometer. In the TPT a fast
swith will reflect an incident photon into the long path of
the TPT only for photons in |e〉; otherwise, it is swithed
off so that the |l〉 photons simply propagate along the
short path of the TPT. The fast swith is controlled ac-
cording to the timing of the pulsed photons by noting
that |e〉 and |l〉 are two time states distinguishable with
respect to the time fiducial signal (see Fig. 1). In this
way, the TPT transforms coherently |e〉 (|l〉) to |d〉 (|u〉),
with |d〉 and |u〉 being two distinguishable paths of pho-
tons. Afterwards, all measurements in (2) can be done
by the linear optics setups in Ref. [13].
The function of a fast switch can be accomplished by
an acousto-optic modulator (AOM). Due to bulk acousto-
optic interaction, an incident laser beam can be either
diffracted (“first order”) by or directly transmitted (“zero
order”) through an acousto-optic medium, depending on
whether the acoustic wave is present or not. Thus, if
|e〉 (|l〉) is subject to the first-order (zero-order) process,
|e〉 and |l〉 will be separated in path, acting exactly as
a TPT. The intensity change (the wavelength change
can be safely neglected) between the zero-order and first-
order beams may be compensated by an attenuator. The
current commercial AOM [24] can reach a rising time of
about several nanoseconds, which is sufficient enough for
our proposal. Moreover, it was already used as a fast
optic switch (On/Off), e.g., by Kuzmich et al. [24] for
generating nonclassical photon pairs.
To summarize, we have proposed a double-
entanglement-based QC protocol that is both efficient
and deterministic. The deterministic feature and high
efficiency of our protocol have obvious advantages in a
practical utility. Importantly, our protocol is within the
reach of current technology and even allows a robust
intermediate-distance realization.
Note added in proof.—Recently, M. Genovese kindly
informed us their related work (Ref. 25) using path-time
double entanglement in nondeterministic QKD.
We thank Y.-A. Chen, X.-B. Wang and Z. Zhao for use-
ful discussions. This work was supported by the Fok Ying
Tung Education Foundation, the NNSFC and the CAS.
We also acknowledge funding by the European Commis-
sion under Contract No. 509487 and the Alexander von
Humboldt Stiftung.
[1] A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, Phys. Rev. 47,
777 (1935).
[2] J.S. Bell, Physics (Long Island City, N.Y.) 1, 195 (1964).
[3] A. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[4] C.H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the
IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems
and Singal Proceeding, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New
York, 1984), p.175.
[5] C.H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and N.D. Mermin, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 68, 557 (1992).
[6] C.H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992).
[7] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev.
Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002); and references therein.
[8] B. Huttner and N. Gisin, Phys. Lett. A 228, 13 (1997);
C. Fuchs et al., Phys. Rev. A 56, 1163 (1997); J.I. Cirac
and N. Gisin, Phys. Lett. A 229, 1 (1997).
[9] V. Scarani and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 87, 117901
(2001); Phys. Rev. A 65, 012311 (2002).
[10] D.M. Greenberger, M.A. Horne, A. Shimony, and A.
Zeilinger, Am. J. Phys. 58, 1131 (1990).
[11] J.-W. Pan et al., Nature (London) 403, 515 (2000).
[12] A. Cabello, Phys. Rev. Lett. 86, 1911 (2001); ibid. 87,
010403 (2001).
[13] Z.-B. Chen et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 160408 (2003).
[14] A. Beige et al., J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 35, L407 (2002).
[15] Z. Zhao et al., quant-ph/0211098.
[16] D. Bruß, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 3018 (1998); H. Bechmann-
Pasquinucci and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev. A 59, 4238 (1999).
[17] C. Simon and J.-W. Pan, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 257901
(2002).
[18] A.I. Lvovsky, Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 098901 (2002).
[19] H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci and A. Peres, Phys. Rev. Lett.
85, 3313 (2000); N.J. Cerf et al., ibid. 88, 127902 (2002).
[20] T. Yang et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 240406 (2005).
[21] J.-W. Pan et al., Nature (London) 423, 417 (2003).
[22] J. Brendel et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 82, 2594 (1999); I.
Marcikic et al., Phys. Rev. A 66, 062308 (2002).
[23] I. Marcikic et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 180502 (2004).
[24] See, e.g., http://www.a-a.fr/Acousto optic products/;
A. Kuzmich et al., Nature (London) 423, 731 (2003).
[25] M. Genovese and C. Novero, Eur. Phys. J. D 21, 109
(2002).
